

# THE RELEVANCE OF WHITEHEAD FOR CONTEMPORARY BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

By

László Fórizs

The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas illuminating the social system. It reverses the slow descent of accepted thought toward inactive commonplace. If you like to phrase it so, philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct insight into depth as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism: not by explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel characterizations, rationally coordinated. Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seek to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization. In each case there is reference to form beyond the direct meanings of words. Poetry allies itself to metre, philosophy to mathematic pattern.<sup>2</sup>

## Prologue

Only the words nothing else remained  
Only the words only the words  
I am swimming in the word's lake where  
The sentence of hair-weed tangles

My body sinking me to the depth  
But depth is also name only  
Denominate and the name the word  
Will reach the shore while escaping

Only the words nothing else remained  
I don't have the bread and the wine  
I am a soul that always stumble  
Dragging the body like a clog

Over the threshold that separates  
Nothingness from existence though  
This threshold itself is name only  
I am straying among the words

In dread oh wish I were still alive  
What can I do it cannot be  
Write me dear friend into your book  
Turn me up there so that I be<sup>3</sup>

## I. The relevance of the science of linguistics for Indian philosophy

The importance of grammar for understanding Indian philosophy

Comparing Eastern and Western thought Daniel H. H. Ingalls made a clear statement about the difference between Greek and Indian philosophy:

In philosophizing the Greeks made as much use as possible of mathematics. The Indians, curiously failed to do this, curiously because they were good mathematicians. Instead, they made as much use as possible of grammatical theory and argument.<sup>4</sup>

In the following paragraphs I will analyze this ‘grammatical’ way of thinking and its philosophical implications. Without a proper understanding of this seemingly different background the assessment of the relevance of Whitehead’s thoughts for Buddhist philosophy could not be a really promising enterprise.

### Pāṇini’s grammar

The earliest grammatical treatises of mankind are probably the Prātiśākhya attached to the collections of the Vedas. In the Prātiśākhya literature the practice of enumeration was adopted, but this method cannot describe the innumerable forms of a living language. In order to overcome the difficulty one has to follow a more systematic and scientific approach, namely the introduction of general and particular rules by the method of ‘functional generalizations.’<sup>5</sup> This is exactly what Pāṇini and his school did.

The Indian grammarians invented a new science or probably the earliest form of any science. The introduction of all the different kinds of rules was made possible by the adopted methodology that was nothing else than an ancient form of Whitehead’s method of imaginative generalization. By the help of these rules Pāṇini generated a linguistic structure for which there was no upper limit, so in our modern time it could have been termed rightly as a generative grammar.

According to Frits Staal:

The main innovation [of the system] was a methodology that developed the familiar concept of rule into something more abstract and led to the study of categories of rules, rule systems and rule order. This was possible because Pāṇini’s rules were formalized in a manner that corresponds to mathematical formalization in the West.<sup>6</sup>

### Interpretation of the term *kāraṅka*

I think there is another and even more important property of the grammar, namely its very structure which is clearly relational. The realization that the new science of linguistics was not based on a substance theory but was relational in essence goes back probably to Pāṇini himself. Such a view can have partial support from Pāṇ 2. 3. 7; nevertheless, it was Patañjali who showed that *sādhana* (an other term for *kāraṅka*) could not be a substance (*dravya*). He realized that if *kāraṅka* or *sādhana* were a substance; a particular substance – remaining the same – would not be able to function as different *kāraṅkas* in different contexts. Here is the explanation in Patañjali’s own words in the commentary of vārttika 9 on Pāṇ 2. 3. 1 in his Mahābhāṣya (tr. K. Bhattacharya):

*yat karma karmaiva syād yat karaṅam karaṅam eva yad adhikaraṅam adhikaraṅam eva.* That which is an object (*karman*) would remain an object, that which is an instrument would remain an instrument, that which is a locus (*adhikaraṅa*) would remain a locus [, and so on].<sup>7</sup>

Patañjali therefore rightly arrived at the conclusion that *sādhana* was *guṇa*.<sup>8</sup> Following the same line of thought Bartṅhari defined *sādhana* as ‘the capacity (*sāmarthya*) or the power (*śakti*) that a thing has to bring an action to accomplishment.’ Candrakīrti also held that ‘all the *kāraṅkas* are powers (*śakti*) that are diversified in accordance with the diversity of actions,’ and ‘the agent is one of *kāraṅkas*.’<sup>9</sup>

### Modern Interpretation of the *kāraṅka*-system

The problem of the interpretation of the word *kāraṅka* is not an easy one. In Bhattacharya’s words it is a ‘sharply debated question.’<sup>10</sup> What Whitehead said long ago is quite relevant here:

You understand a philosopher when you see the potentialities of his philosophy – his ‘logical chess-board;’ whether he makes good moves or bad is a minor detail.<sup>11</sup>

Modern scholars (C. Hooykaas, G. Cardona, F. Staal) basically did nothing else than realized or reinvented that the real question is not the meaning of the term in isolation, e.g. in Pāṇ 1. 4. 23, but the complex relational role the *kārakas* play.

The connexions between nouns, verbs and other forms were dealt with in his grammar by systems of relations, the most important of which were ‘grammatical relations’ called *kāraka* that operate on different levels.<sup>12</sup>

My view is that Pāṇini’s logical chessboard is nothing else than the relational structure of the system. I think this relational interpretation of the *kāraka* system is not only the most elaborate one, but it also has the advantage of making the deep analogy with Whitehead’s thought transparent in a quite natural way. I will use this interpretation in my discussion.

Naturally comes the question: where do these profound problems come from and what do they demonstrate? My answer is that such problems arise from the never ending quest for examples and counter-examples to the rules. The solution of them can demonstrate the success of the imaginative generalization because it can be tested exactly by these experimentations. Everything was given for the success of the imaginative experiments of that great generation of Indian grammarians (Pāṇini and his school, Kātyāyana, Patañjali). Their construction originated in the Sanskrit language itself as storehouse of human experience. They started from the ground of particular observations. In Patañjali’s words:

When you need pots, you go to a potter; but when you need words, you don’t go to a grammarian; you go to the people who speak the language.<sup>13</sup>

The imaginative experiments could guarantee the applicability of the results of the generalizations beyond the restricted locus from which they had originated.<sup>14</sup>

In the following chapter we will see how Nāgārjuna stretched the applicability of the generalizations of the grammarians to the farthest possible end; by doing so he became one of the most successful and influential philosopher ever lived in the land of India.

## II. Nāgārjuna’s analysis of motion

The fundamental sentence (MK 2, 1)

*gataṃ na gamyate tāvad agataṃ naiva gamyate  
gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate*

”What has already been moved is not moving; what has not yet been moved is not moving. Independently of what has been moved and what has not yet been moved what is being moved is not moving.”<sup>15</sup>

This sentence is a store-house of ideas. There is a surprisingly complex structure under its surface. The following sections are devoted to the analysis of this beautiful descendant of the Rigvedic brahman-enigmas.<sup>16</sup> If one understands the logico-grammatical web of this sentence one will be able to grasp not only the other arguments in the second chapter, but also almost all the demonstrations of the whole work, especially that of the eighth chapter.

Preliminaries for interpreting the fundamental sentence – the *kāraka* system at work

I think there are people in the audience who are not familiar with the science of linguistics of Pāṇini so it seems helpful to show how it works in an example. It will help us to understand the discussions of the following chapters, especially the grammatical background of Nāgārjuna's analysis of motion. The example is taken from Frits Staal. The analysis follows his simplified demonstration of how the Sanskrit sentence, *devadattaḥ pacati odanam* ("Devadatta is cooking rice") can be generated by the help of Pāṇini's rules.

The derivation may appear to be arbitrary and *ad hoc*, but that is because it cannot demonstrate the most powerful feature of the system: namely that methods of analysis that apply to this specific sentence also apply to infinitely many others. Active sentences (such as our example 'Devadatta is cooking rice') are not more basic than their passive counterparts 'Rice is being cooked by Devadatta,' or related nominalizations such as 'Devadatta, a cooker of rice,' 'rice, cooked by Devadatta,'...etc. All of these were regarded as alternative realizations of the same underlying structure. In each case a specific path of rules leads to a specific result.<sup>17</sup>

The first step in the process of generation is the selection of nominal and verbal items from the lexicon; in our case *Devadatta-*, *odana* (rice) and  $\sqrt{pac}$ - (cook). Then comes the selection of the 'independent agent' (*Devadatta-*), the agent's 'principal goal' (*odana*) and the reference to 'ongoing time' for the verbal root (*pac-*).

The rules will now specify which abstract, 'meta-linguistic' or 'grammatical' markers have to be attached to the lexical items. These enable us to attach subsequently the 'real' nominal and verbal endings, but also entail the application of other rules that are necessary for the correct forms to be obtained.<sup>18</sup>

For example, to get the active form, *pacati*, an '-infixa-' and '-suffixti' have to be attached to the verbal root, *pac*. This seems a bit odd but the example will help us to see the logic behind it. The application of the rules '-infixa-' and '-suffixti' for the verbal root *pac* leads to the ungrammatical form *\*pacinfixasuffixti*. Now the repeated application of the metarule that the metalinguistic markers have to be removed from the finally derived forms leads to the correct form: *pacati*.

To get the whole sentence the 'goal-function' and the 'agent-function' have to be expressed. The former is done by assigning the accusative ending *-am* to the nominal item that bears that function, while the latter can be done by assigning the instrumental ending *-ena* to the corresponding nominal stem.

We have arrived at an interesting situation, i.e. at the ungrammatical form: *\*devadattena pacati odanam*, "by Devadatta is cooking rice." The reason is that in our particular case for the generation of the sentence we have already chosen the verbal ending *-ti* (third person singular) to express the agent.

Now the leading principle of the whole system, Pāṇini's 2. 3. 1 metarule, *anabhihite*, "if not already expressed," comes into play to block the ungrammatical form and to give room to another rule according to which the nominative case should be assigned when only the notion of nominal stem, gender and number remain to be expressed. By this rule *devadatta-* is transformed to the form *devadattaḥ*. So the path finally leads to the correct sentence: *devadattaḥ pacati odanam*, "Devadatta is cooking rice."

#### A more complicated example – Kātyāyana's problem

Now let us see a more difficult derivation. There are different ways of denoting a locus. If the generation of a sentence starts with a nominal item one can use, for example, the locative ending; another possibility (in accordance with Pāṇ, 3, 3, 117) is the application of the affix *-ana* after a verbal root. Now the question arises: Is anything wrong with the expression *āsane āste*, "[he/she] is sitting in a posture"? (Kātyāyana, vārttika 9 on Pāṇ, 2, 3, 1.) Why

haven't the application of the seemingly redundant locative ending been blocked by the leading principle, *anabhihite*, "if not already expressed?"

Only Patañjali could solve this interesting problem in his commentary on vārttika 9. The source of the difficulty was the implicit assumption that there was only one agent and one action involved in the derivation. Patañjali realized that this was an oversimplification; in fact more than one action and more than one agent was involved, namely an agent now and the 'other' agent(s) at different times. The present ending *-te* refers to the present (*vartamānakālaś ca pratyayaḥ*), while the affix *-ana* refers to all the times, i.e. past, present and future (*sarvakālaś ca pratyayaḥ*). Therefore no blocking is needed.

But the situation is a bit even more complicated. The following example will clarify the point: somebody performs simultaneously the actions of standing, speaking and looking. Now the agent is not equal to the subject, a substance, call him Devadatta, but there are different agents involved corresponding to the different 'powers that bring an action to accomplishment' for each of these actions which reside in him. A subject is usually treated as a whole. It can really function as a whole, for example he can walk; but, of course, his parts can also function as parts. So *a person* who is sitting now and *the parts* of his body taking up a particular posture which state involves all the three times *are not the same agents*, and what makes them different is not only the different time reference involved.

The key example – the foundation of Nāgārjuna's paradox

Finally, let us see the following expression, *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate* used by Nāgārjuna in his analysis of motion. Now the starting point is the verbal root *gam* that has the meanings, move, go, travel and understand. There is an important difference between the verb *gam* and most of the other verbs of the language. A verb, when transitive, usually affects its object (*karman*). If rice is cooked there is a change in the rice, so Indian grammarians say that the action is 'in the object.' But usually no essential change is caused to a village by travelling to it; and similarly understanding a book does not change the book. In our case the action is an activity (*kriyā*) in the agent (*kartṛ*) as the grammarians would say.

Contrary to the previous example (*āsane āste*), in the case of *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate* there is no escape from the paradoxical situation. In this case both *gamyamānaṃ* and *gamyate* refers to the activity (motion) of the same agent (somebody or something as a whole) and both actions take place at the same time, i.e. at the present. Such an activity cannot be expressed twice. So the form cannot be generated, it should have had to be blocked by the leading principle. It is ungrammatical. We will see the far reaching consequences of this result in the next chapter.<sup>19</sup>

Some further remarks on the 'non-generation' of the expression *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate*

It is important to note that the forms *gamyamānaṃ* and *gamyate* can both have reflexive and passive meanings; so the generation of the sentence would be different for them. In fact both derivations (one with the passive and the other with the reflexive meaning) have some additional technical difficulties and interesting features.

(i) In the case of the passive the expression *gamyamānaṃ* means something like "[x] that is being travelled." Now the question arises: What can this x refer to? *Gamyamānaṃ* (and also *gatam* and *agatam*) refers to a neuter x; so grammatically it cannot be the road or any equivalent of it, because the Sanskrit terms for it, *mārga*, *patha* and *adhvan* are all of masculine gender. It was Candrakīrti who solved this problem long ago by assuming that a whole aggregate of roads was meant; and in our modern time Bhattacharya, who also preferred the choice of the passive meaning for the generation, rightly followed his interpretation.

In fact according to its form the word *gamyamānam* is an object (*karman*) since it has the neutral nominal ending, *-m*. But, semantically, it must be the locus (*adhikaraṇa*) the function of which is to hold either the agent or the object in which the action inheres. Now the verbal root *gam* describes an action that resides in an agent (*kartṛ*), and so the locus holds the agent.

(ii) The derivation with the reflexive has its own problems. First of all, it can have a meaning that is quite strange from the grammatical point of view. To explain the difficulty let us consider Professor Alex Wayman's example of the employment of *gam* with the reflexive meaning which is based on a dialogue from the famous scene of Śakuntalā's going; Kalidāsa, Śakuntalā, Act I, verses 29–30:

Anusūyā: So where are you going to go now?  
 Śakuntalā (aside): I should not leave him if I were mistress of my fate.  
 Priyamvadā: Why doesn't she [Śakuntalā] go now?  
 Śakuntalā: Now also am I dependent on you? I'll go when I pleased.<sup>20</sup>

Śakuntalā's motion could be termed *svacchanda-gamanam* ("walking at ease") or equivalently *svacchanda-gati-vikramā* ("gait according to one's own will") in the theory of dramatic performance (Nāṭyaśāstra) in complete agreement with the reflexive employment of the verb *gamyate* which means: "she goes of herself" (*svayam eva*).<sup>21</sup> Well, it seems that the reflexive meaning of the above example does not fit to the scheme. It is neither the goal (the village) nor the locus (the road) what is relevant here but the 'how of the going' or the activity of going itself.

In any case, note that the above derivation which came to the end that in isolation the sentence *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate* is ungrammatical does not depend on the particular choice of the passive or reflexive meaning of '-infixya-' and '-suffixte.'

### III. Implications of the fundamental sentence

#### Nāgārjuna's grammatically based paradox

We saw that in a historical perspective Candrakīrti realised (or more precisely reinvented) the grammatical background of the master's arguments in his commentary, *Prasannapadā*, on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*. In our modern time K. Bhattacharya advanced further in understanding the grammatical implications. He could show that in the case of *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate* there was no escape from the null result of the generation because both *gamyamānam* and *gamyate* refer to the activity (motion) of the same agent and both actions take place at the same time, i.e. at the ongoing present.

There would be no difficulty if the two actions of moving or travelling referred to two different times; there would then be two powers ... functioning as the agents of the actions of moving in two different times. But, in the instance under consideration, both actions refer to the same time, the present. Hence the paradox.<sup>22</sup>

#### Interpretation of the paradox

"What has already been moved is not moving; what has not yet been moved is not moving. *Independently of what has been moved and what has not yet been moved* what is being moved is not moving." If I were asked to say it in one sentence what this nonsense is all about I would probably say it is a masterpiece of thought that tell you everything about the method of imaginative experimentation and the proper application of the critique of abstrac-

tion. I am in clear disagreement with professor Bhattacharya on this important issue. He still missed some of the main points; and as a consequence of this he could not give a proper philosophical interpretation for Nāgārjuna's analysis of motion.

That neither the road that has already been travelled nor the one that has not yet been travelled is being travelled at present needs no explanation: in the former motion has ceased, in the latter it has not yet occurred. But how can Nāgārjuna say that the road that is being travelled at present is not being travelled at present?<sup>23</sup>

The answer to this question is easy: in no way. Why? Because he has never said that. His sentence contained the qualification: *Independently of what has been moved and what has not yet been moved.*<sup>24</sup> In the fundamental sentence the expression *gatāgatavinirmuktam*, the qualifier of *gamyamānam* cannot be omitted; it is required by the proper application of the critique of abstraction.

Nāgārjuna's analysis of motion should be interpreted as a joint application of his own versions of the method of imaginative generalization and the critique of abstraction. It can be seen from this perspective why professor Bhattacharya's criticism is irrelevant here. It is based on a misapprehension of the real significance and foundation of the analysis:

I do believe that the Mādhyamika, who uses the grammarian's concepts to serve his dialectical needs, is open to criticism from the grammarian's own side. The latter would say that the Mādhyamika is unduly mixing up facts of language with ontological considerations which are foreign to them: these facts are to be explained, not, as the Mādhyamika assumes, or feigns to assume, by reference to the 'external being' (*bāhyasattā*) or 'primary being' (*mukhyasattā*) of the things, but only by reference to their 'superimposed being' (*aupacārikāsattā* or *upacārasattā*) which is conceived and externally projected by the mind of the speaker and hearer. It is this being, which exists in the mind alone (*buddhisattā*), that is the ground of all verbal behaviour.<sup>25</sup>

We have already seen in the previous sections how the method of functional generalization led to rules and metarules and how the never-ending quest for examples and counter-examples to the rules enlarged the horizon of the Indian linguists and philosophers. In fact this enlargement of the horizon is a must for even the partial success of imaginative generalization. Nāgārjuna did nothing else than maximally enlarged the horizon. On the other hand from a Whiteheadian perspective the above separation (external things and mind alone) is nothing but a myth and an example of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

Nāgārjuna's application of the paradox

Once getting the fundamental sentence Nāgārjuna could show by a series of dialectical arguments that relational-origination<sup>26</sup> (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and hence emptiness (*śūnyatā*) is based on the stubborn facts of everyday experiences. He could rightly say:

*Sarvasaṃvyavahārāmśca laukikān pratibādhase  
yatpratītyasamutpādaśūnyatāṃ pratibādhase*

"If you deny *pratītya-samutpāda* you deny *śūnyatā* itself; but this would contradict all of [the stubborn facts of] everyday practices (/experiences)." (MK 24, 36.)

This was a great achievement because originally relational-origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) was seemingly based on moral grounds alone, namely on the interrelatedness of (moral) actions and their reactions. Nāgārjuna could demonstrate that there was a deeper, and in a sense more realistic, foundation for the Tathāgata's teachings.

The most important implications of Nāgārjuna's analysis of motion

Now let us turn our attention to the question: What does the imaginative experimentation of Nāgārjuna tell us about the world of experiences of stubborn facts from which it originated? The answer to this question is quite important because it is the very point where Whitehead's relevance to Indian or most specifically to Buddhist philosophy is the most transparent. There are at least two messages of the paradox. According to the first one the non-generation of *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate* unfolds the inadequacy of the subject-predicate form of expressions to describe even the 'simplest' stubborn facts of everyday experience.<sup>27</sup> The second one implies that experience cannot be located simply as present perception; experience necessarily involves duration originating in a relational complex.<sup>28</sup> This result is also shared with Whitehead.<sup>29</sup>

#### IV. An extension of the argument

##### Viṣṇu's steps

The real power of a philosophical argument is its generality. Nāgārjuna's argument applies equally well to Devadatta's motion as to Viṣṇu's steps which are as follows (in the words of the Vedic poet priest, Dīrghatamas, Rigveda, 1, 154, 1 tr. W. Doniger):

*viṣṇor nú kaṃ vīryāṇi prā vocaṃ  
yāh pārthivāni vimamé rājāṃsi |  
yó áskabhāyad úttaraṃ sadhásthaṃ  
vicakramāṇás trayidhórugāyáh ||*

"Let me now sing the heroic deeds of Viṣṇu,  
Who has measured apart the realms of earth,  
Who propped up the upper dwelling-place,  
Striding far as he stepped forth three times."<sup>30</sup>

In this case the road is not ready out there to travel. Viṣṇu has to travel the is to be road. The assumption of an independent, already existing road, or a whole aggregate of roads, is not well established; it is merely a myth. One can use the reflexive meaning equally for the non-generation of *\*gamyamānaṃ gamyate* which seems to fit even better the case of the god's steps. This leads readily to the conclusion that there is no already given 'external' space where the motion of the god takes place, either. It is time (and, as a consequence of this, space) itself that is being formed by the god's steps.

In a strict sense no goal, no place is there, only the how is important, the control of himself in going. It is essentially *svacchanda-gamanam* ("walking at ease") or equivalently *svacchanda-gati-vikramá* ("gait according to one's own will.") This creational activity is something like a game, or dance, or ritual activity. It is for its own sake. It has its own satisfaction. It is without any reason. In a sense it is meaningless. It is pure activity. Dīrghatamas' often quoted mantra, Rigveda 1.164.60 = 10. 190.16, is quite relevant here (tr. W.N. Brown):

*yajñéna yajñám ayajanta devás  
tāni dhármāni prathamāni āsan |*

"With the sacrifice the gods performed the sacrifice.  
These were the first ordinances."<sup>31</sup>

On the other hand from the generality of the argument it follows that the situation is as paradoxical for Viṣṇu as for Devadatta. In fact the argument is not sensitive at all for the nature

of the agent. There is no essential difference between Devadatta's motion on the road and Viṣṇu's steps.<sup>32</sup> The example only sheds new light to the already established paradox; and makes it easier to accept the outcome: there is no independently existing [aggregate of] road[s] for Devadatta, either.

#### Participatory creation – the allegory of weaving

The very essence of creation (and that of process) is participation. In fact, the idea of participatory creation is much older than the Mādhyamika's discovery. It is the moral of the image of weaving as an allegory of sacrifice and creation itself throughout the Rigveda, and a form of its statement goes back at least to Dīrghatamas, who also uses the imagery of weaving<sup>33</sup> in the context of sacrificial contest (Rigveda, 1, 164, 5):

*pākaṃ pṛchāmi mānasāvijānan  
devānām enā nīhitā padāni |  
vatsé baṣkāye ādhi saptā tāntūn  
vī tatnīre kavāya otavā u ||*

”I ask in my heart, yet uninspired,  
About the hidden footprints of the gods.  
Over the ‘One year old’ the poets  
Stretched out seven threads to weave.”

In the *Nāsadīya*-hymn it is becoming itself, the continuous unfolding of the universe, that is described by the following imagery (Rigveda, 10, 129, 5ab):

*tiraścīno vītato raśmīr eṣām  
adhāḥ svid āśī3d upāri svid āśī3t |*

”Their measuring-cord has been extended across (*vi-tataḥ*);  
[but,] was there really (*svid*) below? Was there really above?”

By stretching out their measuring cord they do nothing else than actively participate in the unfolding of a complex of relations (upper–down, etc.). The power of the sentence is the use of the verb *tan*; the past participle, *vi-tataḥ*, means not only something ‘stretched over,’ but also something ‘woven.’ So these seers (*kavayah*) are extending over their cords not in an already existent universe, but it is the very creation of the universe they are participating in by their measuring activity. This is the real mystery of re-creation. In the loom of sacrifice weaving the Hymn of Creation the woof of the words of the sages is woven across the warp of the divine Word as a base.

## Epilogue

Let me finish the lecture with two quotations from the two great philosophers on faith, wisdom and human dignity. The first sentences are from Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*, 1, 5–6:

*Sukham abhyudayas tatra mokṣo naiḥśreyaso mataḥ  
asya sādhanasaṃkṣepaḥ śraddhāprajñe samāsataḥ*

”Advancing upwards is well-being, freedom is the highest state;  
while the methods of their realization are faith and wisdom.”

*śrāddhatvād bhajate dharmam prājñatvād veti tattvataḥ  
prajñā pradhānam tv anayoḥ śraddhā pūrvamgamāsyā tu*

”By faith one opens to the Law, by wisdom one understands reality;  
Out of this two the ruler is wisdom, but it is faith that goes in front.”

The second comes from *Dialogues of Whitehead* as recorded by Lucien Price:

”This awareness of worth in human beings,” said Whitehead, ”develops very early. Most attempts to formulate it in words fail. When I meet it, this quiet worth, where there is the most of it, in common life, I can see that it is a value above all other values, that it outranks all other ranks, and yet its dignity is totally unselfconscious. This was my first discovery when I went to work in a city. Boston in those years was a good deal wickeder than it is now. It was really grim, and there were places in it that were downright sinister. And yet ... one kept encountering this silent, innate worth in the most unlikely places: on the docks, in police courts, in slum tenements; there was no name for it, yet there it was, and one always knew it when encountered. Truly, I may say to you that this is the only thing of any importance that I know; and, as you see, I cannot communicate it; all I can tell you is that I have ‘seen something.’ But there are no words of it.”<sup>34</sup>

## Notes

1 – Invited lecture presented at the Silver Anniversary Whitehead Conference, August 4–9, Claremont, California.

2 – A. N. Whitehead, “Modes of Thought,” Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1938, p. 237.

3 – István Baka: “Csak a szavak” (1984), in “Tájkép fohással,” Jelenkor Kiadó, Pécs, 1996, p. 282. Translated by László Főríz (1998).

4 – D. H. H. Ingalls, “A comparison of Indian and Western Philosophy,” *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras: XXII, 1954, pp. 1–11.

5 – G. Cardona’s term.

6 – Frits Staal, “Ritual and Mantras: Rules Without Meaning,” Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1996 (New York, Peter Lang Publishing Inc, 1990, 1993), p. 43.

7 – K. Bhattacharya, “Nāgārjuna’s Arguments Against Motion: Their Grammatical Basis,” In “A Corpus of Indian Studies. Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri,” Calcutta, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1980, p. 94.

8 – Ibid., p. 89.

9 – Ibid., p. 93 note 24.

10 – Ibid., p. 95.

11 – Susanne K. Langer’s Notes on Whitehead’s Course on the Philosophy of Nature, edited by Rolf Lachmann, *Process Studies*, 26/1–2, 1997, p.128.

12 – Frits Staal, Ibid., p. 43.

13 – Patañjali, “Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya.”

14 – Cf. A. N. Whitehead, “Process and Reality,” Corrected Ed., New York, Free Press, 1978 (1929), p. 5.

15 – If it is not stated otherwise the translations are mine in this paper and they are quoted with normal size letters. I am giving three other renderings of the fundamental sentence to illustrate some of the possible divergences:

“What has already gone (or moved forward) does not of itself go to that extent. What has not yet gone does not of itself go at all. One is lead to misunderstand a present-going (or treading) excluding both the ‘already gone’ and the ‘not yet gone.’” (tr. A. Wayman, “The Gait (gati) and the Path (mārga) – Reflexions on the Horizontal,” *JAOS*, 105.3, 1985, p. 585)

“The gone is not arrived at, and the ungone is not arrived at; the just being-gone is not arrived at separate from the gone and the ungone.” (tr. R. Robinson, “Early Madhyamika” in “India and China,” Madison, Milwaukee and London, 1967, p. 42.)

”First, [the road] that has already been travelled (*gata*) is not being travelled at present; nor the one that has not yet been travelled (*agata*). And [the road] that is being travelled at present, – road independent of that which has been travelled and that which has not yet been travelled, – is not being travelled at present.” (tr. K. Bhattacharya, Ibid. p. 8.)

16 – Cf. the relevant Chapters (‘Ritual contest,’ ‘The allegory of weaving,’ ‘The *brahman* as an enigma,’ ‘The *brahman* as the potentiality for re-creation,’) in László Főríz, “Creation Hymns of the Rigveda,” Budapest, Farkas Lőrinc Imre Kiadó, 1995, (In Hungarian).

17 – Frits Staal, Ibid., p. 44.

18 – Ibid., p. 45.

19 – Cf. A. N. Whitehead: “The concept that two propositions, which we will name *p* and *q*, are inconsistent, must mean that in the modes of togetherness illustrated in some presupposed environment the meanings of the propositions *p* and *q* cannot occur. Neither meaning may occur or either may occur, but not both. Now process is the way by which the universe escapes from the exclusions of inconsistency.” “Modes of Thought,” p. 75.

20 – Alex Wayman, Ibid., pp. 579–588.

21 – In this particular case the use of *gamyate* is based on R. Pischel’s reconstruction of the Sanskrit (*sāmprataṃ kiṃ na gamyate*) from the Prākṛit (*sampadaṃ kiṃ na gacchādi*). Kālidāsa’s Śakuntalā, critically edited by R. Pischel, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univ. Press, 1922, p.116.

22 – K. Bhattacharya, “The Grammatical Basis of Nāgārjuna’s Arguments. Some Further Considerations.” *Indologica Tauriensia*, Vol. VIII–IX, 1980–1981, p. 38.

23 – K. Bhattacharya, “Nāgārjuna’s Arguments Against Motion.” *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (JIABS)*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1985, p. 9.

24 – Professor Bhattacharya preferred the passive meaning everywhere in his translation so in his case the qualification is the following: “Road independent of that which has been travelled and that which has not yet been travelled, – is not being travelled at present,” Ibid. p. 8.

25 – Ibid., p. 12.

26 – I accepted professor Kenneth Inada’s rendering of *pratītya-samutpāda* instead of the mainstream term, interdependent co-origination, because of its deeper philosophical connotations.

27 – Judit Fehér, “Nāgārjuna, the Master of Mahāyāna Buddhism.” Budapest, Farkas Lőrinc Imre Kiadó, 1997, (In Hungarian).

28 – The orthodox yoga darśana of Patañjali does also have such a relational structure which, in a sense, operates at a deeper level than the external spatio-temporal correlations. See, for example, Y.S. 3. 14; 4. 9.; 4. 12.; 4. 15. Note that sūtra 4. 15 provides an explanation of the participatory role the mind plays in the *pariṇāma*. However, it is important to see that this

participating mind and consciousness itself is also an outcome of the process of *pariṇāma*.

29 – Cf. Appendix II.

30 – Wendy Doniger, “The Rig Veda, An Anthology.” New York, Penguin Books, 1981, p. 226.

31 – W. N. Brown, “Theories of Creation in the Ṛgveda.” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 85, 1965, p. 32.

32 – Cf. “‘Actual entities’ – also termed ‘actual occasions’ – are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space.” A. N. Whitehead, “Process and reality,” p. 18.

33 – See the Chapter ‘The Allegory of Weaving’ in László Főríz, “Creation Hymns of the Rigveda.”

34 – “Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead As Recorded By Lucien Price.” Boston, An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1953, p. 195.